

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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THE UNIVERSITY  
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 4 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. DEAN (United States of America)

62-12486

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. ASSUNCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. de A. ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. K. CHRISTOV  
Mr. V. PALINE  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG  
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. E. PEPICH  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia

Mr. T. GEBRE-EGZY  
Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA  
Mr. M.B. NAIR

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. C. RUSSO  
Mr. A. CAGLIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI-OTTIERI  
Mr. G. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. S. GONZALEZ GALVEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. T. WISNIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN  
Mr. H. BLIX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK  
Mr. B.N. BRINSON  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT

United States of America:

Mr. A. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. R.I. SPIERS  
Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUFTI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the fifteenth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. I shall now speak on the nuclear test ban issue in my capacity as representative of the United States.

I should like to share with my colleagues round this table some thoughts of my delegation on the very interesting discussions at the last two plenary meetings on the subject of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

As one of the nuclear Powers, the United States Government and the people of the United States are deeply concerned about the most effective way to obtain a test ban, as well as about every other problem involving nuclear weapons. Because we know full well the destructive power of nuclear weapons, no nation could be more anxious than we to conclude a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments with the necessary safeguards. We keenly feel a special responsibility to the rest of mankind, with whom our fate is inseparably linked, to do our utmost to devise a solution for our difficulties.

Our need is for all the constructive assistance we can find, and it is in this light that we have been particularly grateful for the statements made here by the representatives of so many countries, statements to which we shall give our closest and most earnest attention. I also cannot hide my admiration for the trenchant statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, which laid bare the essential difference in approach and substance between the two nuclear sides.

I wish indeed that I were able to use equally generous words to describe the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union and of his colleagues from the other socialist countries. Unfortunately, however, nothing that these delegations said gave the slightest indication that the Soviet Union might be willing to sign a nuclear test ban treaty which incorporated the international controls necessary from the adequate and effective monitoring of the agreement.

Despite the three conferences of experts which have been held on this subject, in which their scientists participated, and the conclusions of which they approved -- at least in part -- on this crucial point the socialist countries appear to be at odds with the sentiments of every other national represented at this Conference. This is a most unfortunate circumstance, because the only possible basis for fruitful negotiation on a nuclear test ban is the acceptance by all nuclear Powers of the fundamental principle that some form of international control will be applied to monitor the resulting treaty.

(The Chairman, United States)

As Mr. Godber indicated yesterday, there is always the possibility of being flexible on the detailed provisions of a treaty, just as we have been flexible on the details of the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty. But the basic and fundamental principle of adequate and effective international control cannot be compromised as a starting point. It would be like removing the engine from a car and then discussing what colour we should paint the useless body. We are entirely prepared to examine any suggestion made here by any of our colleagues if it shows any promise of leading to progress, just as we have already given very careful thought and review to the earlier statements of the Foreign Ministers on the test ban problem. We shall have our scientists participate in this examination.

We have always applied a high and objective standard to provisions proposed for a nuclear test ban treaty. This is the standard of adequate, effective and scientifically based international control over any commitments which we may assume to end tests of nuclear weapons in all environments.

Let me assure the representative of Burma, for example, that the attainment of 100 per cent perfect control is not possible, and indeed has never entered into our minds. We have always striven to keep the control system within reasonable, workmanlike proportions. The arrangements proposed in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9), which is our basic point of departure in any negotiations, would always leave some risks of successful violations, particularly in the high-altitude, outer-space -- where we have the problem of shielding or testing behind the moon or Venus -- and underground environments. We have always been ready to assume such risks for the greater political gain that would result from the conclusion of a sound and effective internationally-controlled nuclear test ban treaty. In this sense, we have at all times understood that there has always been a major political decision implicit in the whole issue of concluding a nuclear test ban treaty.

However, that political decision was made long ago, in 1958, and in a positive sense. Once it was made, the problem changed form. It then became a matter of devising an international control system which had the soundest possible scientific basis and which embodied sound organizational procedures which would contribute to its effectiveness.

(The Chairman, United States)

We want to sign an effective nuclear test ban treaty, but we have never been willing, and we are not now willing, to accept any control arrangements which would not, by means of their prospective operations, pose a considerable risk of discovery to any potential violator. By this we mean a risk of such size that any rational government, debating whether to attempt a secret nuclear test, would be likely to be deterred by the risk of disclosure from making the attempt.

Mr. Padilla Nervo, the representative of Mexico, who has had great experience in the field of disarmament, observed very correctly at our last meeting that there are only two sanctions which can be applied when a violation of a treaty commitment not to test has occurred. These are, first, the moral condemnation of the violator and, second, the resumption of testing by other Powers.

Judging by what happened in the world last September when the Soviet Union violated its own pledge not to test again if the United States and the United Kingdom did not do so first, I am not sure that the hoped-for moral condemnation is an especially powerful sanction, although of course it might be stronger if a treaty instead of a unilateral pledge were being violated. And the freedom to resume testing may be small, and indeed cold. comfort to another nuclear Power if the violating State has already obtained a lead of many months by its surprise misdeed. Indeed, it may well be too late not only for the nuclear Power, but for the world.

Be this as it may, however, it is evident that these two sanctions will never become available to aggrieved parties if the secret violation is not brought to light, or is not brought to light in time, or if the scientific data remain in confused dispute between the two nuclear sides. This fact reinforces the need for making sure in regard to a nuclear test ban treaty, as in regard to control arrangements over all other disarmament measures, that an effectively functioning international mechanism or organization exists which is technically and scientifically sound and which is accepted by all States as objective and impartial.

As the representative of Burma wisely observed at our meeting on 2 April (ENDC/PV.13), adequate controls must be international controls, because otherwise there would be no way of settling any dispute between rival nuclear Powers by some impartial body. If data as to whether a certain even took place were always subject to dispute, anything could take place without the world's becoming aware of the true facts.

(The Chairman, United States)

Our Soviet colleagues have, on occasion, described this problem as the fanciful product of Western imagination, because they insist that there would not be any disagreements, or at least no disagreements which could not be straightened out by Soviet-Western consultation after the unidentified event had occurred. The trouble with this is that the records of the test ban Conference contain a very sobering example of just such a disagreement that was never resolved. I am referring here to the meetings of the United Kingdom, Soviet Union and United States scientists in December 1959 in Technical Working Group No. 2 (GEN/DNT/TWG.2/PV.1-21). In spite of several weeks of careful review of scientific problems connected with the control system, the Eastern and Western experts left Geneva in complete disagreement, not only on the interpretation of the data and the conclusions which could be drawn, but even on the methods of collecting the raw data which the Soviet scientists challenged. I refer members of the Committee to the records of Technical Working Group No. 2; they make very interesting reading. All of this data, of course, had been acquired from so-called national systems, and this has served as a lesson for us, proving the indispensability of relying upon international systems whose objectivity is taken for granted.

It does not appear to us that this question of a nuclear test ban treaty should be subjected to any special considerations which are not applied to all other disarmament measures. If the entire General Assembly endorsed all eight principles on disarmament worked out last year by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, quite obviously it was not intended that any exception should be made, in any case for application of the sixth principle, which stipulates that each disarmament measure must be accompanied by appropriate controls.

It is curious that it is only with regard to a nuclear test ban treaty that it has been suggested that we contemplate a moratorium based on verbal pledges alone, without adequate international controls. We find ourselves called upon to undertake self-imposed abstinence before there is any international agreement thereon. I call the attention of the Committee to the fact that no one has suggested that we must stop developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, which can carry nuclear weapons in the large megaton range, rockets, supersonic airplanes, nuclear-powered submarines, chemical weapons, or even tanks and guns,

(The Chairman, United States)

before there is a firm and detailed agreement on such matters that provides for the modalities both of disarmament and of the controls and inspection over such measures. Is it not curious that it is only in regard to a test ban that the principle of control is sometimes ignored, even though a test ban that is implemented only by one side and violated in secret by the other can do untold harm to the world's political and military balance?

We in the United States cannot, after all, forget the events of last summer. From our point of view, the Soviet Union's unilateral resumption of nuclear tests on 1 September 1961 was in clear violation of its unilateral pledge not to resume such tests before the United States and the United Kingdom did.

I know full well that Foreign Minister Gromyko, at this Conference, has denied being bound to any such pledge. But I submit that the detailed examination of the verbatim record of my remarks at the fourth meeting of the test ban Sub-Committee fully and unquestionably establishes Soviet responsibility for breaching its word (ENDC/SC.1/PV.4).

The Soviet Union's preparations for its test series were very thorough. They must have taken a long time. Indeed, they must have been started months before, indeed while we were negotiating in another room in the Palais des Nations. The United States was negotiating in good faith and was completely astounded by this development, for we had relied on Premier Khrushchev's promise of 14 January 1960 that the Soviet Union would not be the first to resume tests, and, relying upon that statement, we had dismantled a large part of our testing areas. Since the Soviet Union resumed testing in September, it has taken the United States more than half a year even to make preparations for possible atmospheric tests. Up to now we have had no ready facilities for testing except the tunnels in Nevada which were prepared, after notification to the Soviet Union, as a part of the United States seismic research programme in anticipation of the nuclear research detonations to which the Soviet Union agreed in principle in 1960.

After what we consider to be this demonstration of Soviet bad faith in the matter of a unilateral resumption of testing, the Conference should not be too surprised that we are not willing to put our trust in any control arrangements which we know in advance are less than adequate from a scientific point of view. We recognize that the test ban treaty control system which the United

(The Chairman, United States)

States and the United Kingdom have proposed is designed not to uncover clandestine preparations to test, but only to detect and identify tests after they have taken place. Nevertheless, we must, as I have already said, have at least that degree of scientific assurance that if any secret nuclear tests are attempted there will be a good probability that they will be discovered. How could we ask less and not fail in our responsibilities to our own people and to the free world? I assure the Conference that we wish to be as constructive and as imaginative as possible, but we do not wish to be foolish -- and we would be foolish if we gave up effective international controls.

It is from this careful, sober and objective approach that my delegation has made its preliminary revaluation of the tentative proposals of the last two days made by other representatives around this table. The one common denominator of all of them was an attempt to discover some formula for control which lies somewhere between the current Soviet and Western positions. This is, to be sure, a tried and true method for arriving at political compromises. It is by no means certain that the same method can legitimately be applied to different scientific points of view. Nevertheless, we welcome all these efforts, because it is possible that we have overlooked one or more important factors in our previous proposals.

As the representative of the United Kingdom has made clear, on the Western side our minds are open and our flexibility and our ability to negotiate will not be found wanting. Of course, we will still want to be shown that the control system ultimately utilized will allow for adequate detection and identification of possible nuclear explosions in all environments.

As far as we are concerned at the present time, after a very careful review with our scientists, we still believe that without a global network of properly spaced control posts, operated on an international basis and monitoring seismic events, some seismic signals are bound to be lost -- that is, they will fail to be recorded. If that happened, even with the addition of many hundreds of control posts in distant lands detection would suffer and the ability to plot the geographical location of events, and in many cases to identify them as earthquakes on the basis of the seismographic instrumentation alone, would suffer even more.

(The Chairman, United States)

As I said at the meeting of the Conference on 2 April (ENDC/PV.13), the experts from both the Soviet Union and the Western countries at the Conference of Experts here in Geneva in 1958 knew all about the so-called national systems, but those experts rejected any significant reliance upon them. It may be enlightening to the other delegations if I read a short excerpt from the verbatim record of the twelfth meeting, on 12 December 1959, of Technical Working Group No. 2, to which I have referred earlier this morning. The leader of the United States scientific group, Mr. James Fisk, then said:

"The trustworthiness and reliability and character of the information that would come from the national stations are not on a par with those of the information that would come from the control stations. That is the point; we have been over it before; you understand well enough."

(GEN/DNT/TWG.2/PV.12, page 71)

To this the leader of the Soviet scientific group, Mr. Fedorov, responded immediately:

"That is also our view. We are not very enthusiastic about our own installations. Our seismologists are always arguing among themselves and with the people who have to keep up the stations. Such criticism is very useful, and it certainly is published by our Press. But it is not on the basis of data collected by our stations that we would change the entire control system, and we do not draw important conclusions from such data. We believe that in examining the control system we must always remember that the data which we intend to obtain from national seismic stations will have an auxiliary character" --

I repeat Mr. Fedorov's words, "will have an auxiliary character" --

"I think that we agree on that point; we agreed on it last year." (Ibid.)

Here there is agreement between the United States scientists and the Soviet scientists that the national detection systems are not reliable and that there has to be an international control system. So far as I am aware, there have been no scientific data advanced to change that view. Yet today the Soviet Union would have us rely exclusively on just those national systems which, according to its own chief scientist, were meant to serve only as auxiliaries. We still know of no scientific break-through that would alter this estimate made of the national stations in 1959. I think that is true of our scientists and of the Soviet scientists.

(The Chairman, United States)

On matters such as these we frankly cannot understand why the entire world must accommodate itself to the pseudo-scientific contentions of one nation. We in the West are more than willing to subject ourselves to international controls and to international inspection, and many other countries, such as India, have expressed a similar willingness to have nuclear test ban control posts on their territories in any useful number. We do not understand why exceptions must always be made for the Soviet Union, especially when it is one of the nuclear Powers, in regard to which effective international control is especially important.

What is true of control posts is equally true of the need for control arrangements that allow for the on-site inspection of suspicious seismic events by internationally staffed inspection teams. It was heartening to my delegation to note that most of the speakers in the last two days recognized that provision for such international inspection must be an essential element of any adequate control system over a nuclear test ban. They are vital and essential for the identification of the great bulk of detected seismic events.

We remain convinced that the international control system which we have proposed carries with it no risk whatsoever of espionage for the Soviet Union. We have gone into great detail at several meetings to show why this would not be possible under the precisely spelled out terms of control embodied in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty. We have shown, moreover, that the Soviet position on test ban controls is inconsistent with its position on controls not only over other disarmament measures, but even over such collateral measures as protection against surprise attack.

During all this time, the Soviet delegation has not even bothered to attempt to prove its charges of espionage dangers in this specific test ban control system, but the Soviet delegation has limited itself to ever-widening, sweeping and unsupported generalizations about Western espionage intentions. I should say that this was also our experience with similar accusations made by Mr. Tsarapkin during 1961 at the test ban Conference. We did our best to deal with concrete facts, and in reply were given only dogmatic statements.

(The Chairman, United States)

In fact, I can recall only one occasion when Mr. Tsarapkin even took note of our plea that we deal in specifics instead of in generalities. On that occasion he told us that the Soviet delegation would never help the United States to pursue its intelligence aims by providing the United States delegation with an analysis giving useful hints and clues as to how the control system could best be misused for espionage against the Soviet Union.

Surely, I submit, this is not a serious approach to what are intended by the Soviet Union to be serious charges. Neither are all the citations from Western publications about the collection by the United States of target information. Not only is this a regular function of every General Staff throughout the world, but, if we wished to do so -- and we do not -- we could cite numerous similar statements by Premier Khrushchev and Marshal Malinovski about the Soviet Union's ability to hit all sorts of precise targets in the United States, many thousands of miles away, or its ability to launch missiles which would come at us from all directions and which would avoid our radar -- as Chairman Khrushchev said on 16 March -- or its ability to blow us up with a certain number of missiles, or its ability to bury us, and so forth.

But what is the point: what, after all, does all this prove about the test ban control system which we have proposed? I submit that it proves nothing, because this system is a different sort of creature. We have gone to great pains both to incorporate safeguards for the Soviet Union and to demonstrate how the system could do nothing more than operate in the agreed manner as provided for in a test ban treaty.

In conclusion, let me summarize the United States position:

First, we want a nuclear test ban treaty in which we and the world can have confidence and to which we can entrust a vital aspect of our security; a treaty which gives reasonable assurances that no only the United States but every other country in the world is stopping all nuclear tests and is unable to conduct them in secret without being effectively uncovered as a violator.

Secondly, up to the present time all the scientific data on hand lead us to believe that only an international control system providing for a global network of regularly spaced control posts, for aircraft sampling flights, for on-site inspections of some unidentified seismic events and for an internationally staffed and organized headquarters organ offers an adequate technical basis for control.

(The Chairman, United States)

Thirdly, only such an international system offers politically sound control, since without it there would be no possibility of obtaining impartial data, settling disputes about data, and offering objective evidence to the world of the honest implementation of the nuclear test ban treaty.

Fourthly, nevertheless we are not wedded to any single formula for such an adequate international control system, and we are flexible on all specific details in instances where the adequacy of controls will not be endangered. To this end, we are prepared to examine carefully every suggestion made here to help resolve the present impasse.

Fifthly, at the same time and with the best will in the world we honestly cannot find even an iota of convincing evidence in the speeches of the representatives of the socialist countries to support the Soviet position; to support the rejection of the international control system which the Soviet Union itself accepted for three years; to support the advocacy of national control systems, which the Soviet Union itself spurned for an equal period; to support the Soviet refusal to provide scientific data to bolster its new-found advocacy of national systems; to support the complaints about an espionage danger which the Soviet Union refuses to discuss in concrete terms; and to support the distortion of the United States-United Kingdom offer of 3 September last -- in short, to support the Soviet Union's denial of one of the basic principles of disarmament, namely, effective and adequate international controls.

The United States delegation will not spare its efforts to bring the negotiations on an internationally controlled test ban treaty to a successful conclusion. In this we are fortunate in being able to rely on our staunch partners in the United Kingdom delegation and on the majority of the other delegations around this table.

Unfortunately, however, none of us -- or even all the delegations together -- can settle this nuclear test ban issue by ourselves. We must have co-operation and honest negotiation from the other side as well -- above all from the Soviet delegation, but also from the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. Unless and until the socialist countries change their adamant stand against the very principle of adequate and effective international control over a nuclear test ban treaty, I frankly cannot see any possibilities of an advance. This is the primary problem upon which all our collective attention must be, and I am sure will be, focussed.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The debate which has developed in our Conference on this question, which is now perturbing the population of the whole world and all States, has revealed a number of important facts. First of all, the majority of those who have spoken here have expressed their concern at the deadlock in the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapons tests. Secondly, most of the speakers, and especially the representatives of neutral countries, have expressed great alarm in connexion with the forthcoming United States tests and have spoken emphatically in favour of the discontinuance of all nuclear weapons tests. Forceful statements to this effect have also been made by the representatives of socialist countries. Thirdly, serious apprehension, nay, I would say alarm, has been expressed by many representatives, especially by the representatives of neutral States, in regard to the fate of our Conference and the prospects of solving those questions of general and complete disarmament which are the main problems in the work of this Conference.

It is not by chance that this anxiety about the fate of the whole of our work has been connected with this menace of a new nuclear arms race, which seems inevitable, if we fail to avert the carrying out by the United States of a new series of nuclear weapon tests. Many speakers here have raised a question which applies to all of us; how can we conduct negotiations on general and complete disarmament, of disarmament in general, if we are unable to reach an agreement to discontinue all tests and to avert the tests which are threatening us at this minute?

All these statements, of course, deserve the serious attention of all Governments. The Soviet Government is taking this fear and anxiety very seriously. It has itself already expressed more than once recently its concern about the future of our work, in view of all these circumstances. I mentioned this at one of our previous meetings when I was dealing with the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

The question of national systems of detection and identification and of an international system has been raised in the course of our discussions. Many asked and answered the question whether it was possible to conclude a treaty in which control would be limited to national systems of detection and identification and whether such a treaty was necessary? Many speakers here mentioned the possibility and need of such a treaty and added that it was necessary to reflect on this matter

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

and that the possibilities of the better use of national systems of detection and identification should be carefully weighed. This idea was also expressed by some representatives of neutral countries, in particular by the representatives of Sweden and India. I think they laid special stress on this point.

We entirely agree that this subject should be given serious consideration. We are profoundly convinced that it would be sufficient to limit ourselves to national systems of detection and identification. Our conviction is based on the real facts of life, since all nuclear tests have been detected and identified by national systems of detection. No one has refuted these real facts, and that includes the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. Nor has any one refuted the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom themselves admitted the adequacy of the existing system of detection, that is to say, the national system, for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. No one has refuted this, nor are you in a position to refute it now. I shall return to this question later, but can reaffirm even now that the United States and United Kingdom representatives have been unable to adduce any data which would contravert their own statements of 3 September 1961 (GEN/DNT/120).

We must therefore consider seriously the possibility of the better use of national systems of detection and identification, for we are profoundly convinced that these systems suffice to provide guarantees against possible violation of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, although we ourselves think -- and no one has refuted this either -- that if, during the three years of our negotiations, there was not a single violation, why should there be any such violations after the conclusion of a treaty? That is something no one can prove.

These are all real facts of life. No one is able to refute them. And no one has attempted to refute them.

But what is the position which the United States and the United Kingdom now take up in this connexion? We listened attentively to the detailed statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Dean, at the beginning of our debate. We also listened with attention to his statement today. The earlier statement was filled with a huge number of references to technical data and details of every kind, the purpose of which was to prove that not all tests can be detected. But the gist of all these arguments was that not all underground nuclear tests could be detected. As for other types of tests, no technical data were adduced.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

All the arguments advanced in the earlier statement of Mr. Dean and today were intended to prove that it is impossible to conclude a treaty unless the condition put forward by the United States at the present time is accepted. And this condition is that only an international control system with control posts, aircraft, air sampling flights and on-site inspections of all unidentified events in the territory of the USSR would satisfy the United States. This was the second point in the concluding part of today's statement by Mr. Dean. Only on these conditions is the United States prepared to sign a treaty. I shall say at once that on these conditions there will be no treaty. These conditions are in the form of an ultimatum which we cannot accept. And you cannot prove the necessity of accepting such conditions, because the facts of life are against you.

You have put forward many arguments of all kinds. I do not wish at present to examine each of these arguments, particularly those of a special technical nature. My only reason for not doing so is that I know what a discussion of technical details can lead to. I entirely agree with the statement of the Brazilian representative who recalled his younger days and told us how, thirty years ago here in Geneva, people argued on the technical aspects of disarmament -- about what is an offensive weapon and what is a defensive weapon. And he drew the correct conclusion that in the final analysis it was not a question of these technical details. It was a question of a political solution to the problem. I think this is even truer now than it was then, because the political climate is the decisive element in the solution of such questions.

But I would like to dwell on some of the arguments put forward by Mr. Dean and supported to a considerable extent by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber.

One argument put forward and reaffirmed today by Mr. Dean is that our disagreement with the view that control should necessarily be linked with international inspection and that there would have to be a system of international control, is at variance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) and even with the statement made at a meeting of this Conference by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko. An excerpt from this statement was quoted. But I think that this argument is completely unfounded. Let us read paragraph 6 of the Agreed Principles which

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

was referred to by the United States and the United Kingdom representatives. Paragraph 6 clearly states: "All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations".

(ENDC/5, p.2)

"All disarmament measures"! But this is not the first year that we are discussing these questions connected with the discontinuance of tests. It is universally accepted that the discontinuance of tests in itself is still not a disarmament measure. And you yourselves admit this in your statements. In his last statement Mr. Dean himself said that it was a "preliminary measure". It would still not be a disarmament measure, because there would be no disarmament when nuclear weapon tests are discontinued. No arms would be destroyed and there would be no real disarmament at the time of the discontinuance of tests. So why do you quote paragraph 6, which refers to disarmament measures, in this specific case? Why do you quote the statement of the Foreign Minister of the USSR, who spoke of concrete disarmament measures and said that in this case we ourselves would not agree to any disarmament measure without strict international control? Why, then, do you drag that into this question, which is of a completely different nature?

I know that you will, of course, say "But you yourselves propose to solve this question in connexion with the question of general and complete disarmament". Yes, we have proposed this and we can also agree to it now. But when this question is included in the whole system of measures for general and complete disarmament, it will not become in itself a disarmament measure on that account; it will be included in the system of measures for general and complete disarmament simply because weapons of mass destruction themselves will be eliminated and their production will cease. Then, of course, there would be no sense in conducting any nuclear weapon tests. It would then be natural if it were stated in a treaty that there would not be any nuclear weapon tests and that the weapons themselves would be eliminated and their production stopped. But it does not at all follow from this that the actual discontinuance of such tests is a disarmament measure. Therefore, your argument that we are at variance with paragraph 6 of the Agreed Principles is utterly groundless. It is far-fetched. I do not think that anyone here can sustain this argument in respect of paragraph 6 of the Agreed Principles.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Let us now take the second argument, which was put forward by the representative of the United States at the last meeting and which has now been repeated in an indirect form. Data were adduced about the technical possibilities of detecting underground nuclear explosions. In this connexion Mr. Dean mentioned an example from the "Gnome" underground shot. He said on 2 April:

"Furthermore, detection of the 'Gnome' shot was made relatively easy by the fact that it was fired in a solid salt formation, so that the coupling of the explosive energy into the ground was very strong and the resulting seismic signals were of a high intensity." (ENDC/PV.13, page 21)

But I wanted to go carefully into this technical argument, if only as an example, and my colleagues, who have been carrying on negotiations for a long time, showed me a document dated 18 December 1959. This is a report of the delegation of the United States of America on the work of the Technical Working Group II of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. This document is available to all of you, including the United States delegation. In this document we read the following:

"The delegation of the United States to Technical Working Group II concludes on the basis of its consideration, proceeding from the discussions and the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts, of all data and studies relevant to detection and identification of seismic events as follows:

"5. Rigorous theoretical calculations combined with measurements on the Rainier explosion .....

This Rainier explosion was of a yield of 1.7 kilotons and was carried out in 1957 at the test-site in the State of Nevada, underground in volcanic rock which is a poor conductor of seismic signals.

"..... show that the seismic signal produced by an explosion in a sufficiently large underground cavity in salt or hard rock will be reduced by a factor of 300 or more relative to the seismic signal from an explosion of the same yield under Rainier conditions".

(GEN/DNT/TWG.2/9, Annex IV, pages 1 and 3).

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

That was the conclusion of the technical experts of the United States. The same assertion was contained in the report of the American physicist, Dr. Hans Bethe, in Technical Working Group 2 of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests in December 1959, the same Dr. Bethe to whom I referred in my previous speech. Incidentally, the conclusion of Dr. Bethe have never been refuted by anyone in respect of his views concerning the reasons for the lack of interest of the United States at the present time in an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

As is clear from this report of the technical experts, in December 1959 the United States experts affirmed that the seismic effect of an underground explosion, carried out in a salt cavity, would be weaker by 300 times or even more, than an underground nuclear explosion carried out, for example, in volcanic rock. This means that the signal from such an explosion would be very faint and it would be extremely difficult or even impossible to distinguish it from background noise. And it was just that kind of explosion which was carried out by the United States on 10 December last year. But, in spite of this, it was recorded and identified by seismic stations in Sweden, Finland and Japan, at enormous distances from the site of the explosion - 6-7,000 kilometres.

As you see, the present assertions of the United States representative are completely at variance with the assertions of the United States technical experts in December 1959. Even if the statements were correct that the "Gnome" shot was carried out not in a salt cavity but directly in a salt formation, in that case also, according to the data of the same United States technical experts, it would still have been reduced (and not intensified, as you asserted yesterday) by at least 3 times. So what are your technical opinions worth at the present time? When your political arguments require it, you change your technical conclusions at will. Why do you refer to the technical conclusions of your experts, when today you use them to prove one thing and tomorrow you use them to prove quite the opposite?

I have adduced this example only in order to show how careful one has to be with regard to all these numerous references to the technical conclusions of the experts. It is necessary to realize quite clearly that we are not concerned with technical conclusions but with a political decision of the Government of the United States. The Government of the United States has decided to carry out

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

tests in the atmosphere at the present time. To defend its position it cannot rest its case on the impossibility of detecting tests in the atmosphere. It is seeking justification for its position in underground tests, since here a certain lack of clarity has been brought about by the efforts of Western propaganda, as to whether it is really possible to detect all underground explosions, although actual experience shows that it is.

So the United States refers to all kinds of technical conclusions and now keeps repeating that without international inspection, without an international system of control over underground tests -- and hence for some reason or other over all the rest, although it has not even any technical grounds for this -- it is impossible to conclude a reliable treaty. There is your philosophy in a nutshell. For this reason we treat all these technical conclusions with the greatest caution, and we do not believe those which the Government of the United States is now putting forward on the eve of a new series of tests which it is preparing and which it wishes to justify.

Let us take the third argument. Reference was made to the statements of the United States Government of 3 September (GEN/DNT/120). We have more than once referred to this statement and have failed to get any satisfactory explanation of the present position of the United States in connexion with this statement,

What did Mr. Dean say in this regard in his statement of 2 April? He said: "With regard to my third point, nothing in the United States-United Kingdom proposal of 3 September 1961 for an atmospheric test ban after the third Soviet test negates the need for effective international controls." (ENDC/PV.13, page 23)

You say "nothing negates"? But you stated that with regard to tests in the atmosphere the United States and the United Kingdom were prepared to rely on existing means of detection which they believed to be adequate and did not suggest additional controls. How are you not negating the need for international control when you believe existing means of control to be adequate? And you do not suggest additional controls?

You cannot deny that on 3 September you considered it possible and adequate to have only national means of control and did not demand, did not consider it essential to have, international means of control. You cannot deny this. What did you say later on? You said, Mr. Dean:

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"As the Soviet representative is well aware, that offer did not concern underwater, underground or outer-space environments at all: it related solely to the atmosphere, and even then only to the special situation of that particular moment in history, after the second or third Soviet atmospheric test of nuclear weapons had occurred." (Ibid.)

What follows from this? In the statement of the Soviet Government, which was transmitted to the United Nations on 16 January -- a statement which was made on 2 January -- we read:

"True, it is now being alleged that the statement by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the effect that national means of detection are adequate to ensure control was made 'in an emergency' and that it was not valid now." (DC/198, page 41)

This is essentially the point repeated by Mr. Dean. It is perfectly legitimate to ask: Why is it not valid? Does the international situation have any kind of relation to the scientific and technical possibilities of control? Do the objective readings of scientific instruments lose their validity under the influence of the international political climate? Any sober-minded person will say, "Of course not". This present assertion of yours is contrary to your whole concept of objective scientific and technical data. If on the basis of scientific objective data you believed national means of control to be adequate on 3 September, why do you now believe them to be inadequate today? Why? Explain this to us. You have not given, nor can you give any explanation, because everyone knows that all atmospheric tests can be recorded, detected, and identified literally immediately. Moreover, we say this not only with regard to atmospheric tests but also with regard to tests in outer space and under water.

Today for the first time in the course of our debate you mentioned the fact that you had some doubts about the possibility of identifying tests in outer space. You just touched on this today. You were concerned mainly about tests which might be carried out behind Venus or the moon. But I think we are still a long way from that. Anyway, efforts and resources are not going to be spent now on tests of that type. But it is characteristic that you have mentioned this only now. You are preparing your position for the future. If matters go as far as the discontinuance of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, you will then refer to the statement you made on 4 April in this Committee, to the effect that even then you had doubts about the possibility of detecting nuclear tests in outer space, behind the moon. Surely this is not serious? Does this square with your position of 3 September? Not at all.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Everyone in the world knows that all these tests can unquestionably be detected and that control over them is perfectly adequate on the basis of national systems. There is no need for any international control over these tests. Then why are you demanding, as a condition for concluding a treaty, an international system of control with control posts, aircraft, air sampling flights, inspections and so forth? On what grounds are you demanding this? What do you need it for, if even without it you can fully detect and identify all these tests, and air samples will be taken throughout the territory of the world? Air samples will be taken and the particles resulting from these tests will be discovered, and they will be confirmed by all the stations of the world. Why then do you need control posts, air sampling, aircraft and so forth? Why do you need them?

You stated today, Mr. Dean, that these fears about espionage were artificial, baseless and so forth. We can answer: No, they are not baseless, because everyone knows the facts -- I shall refrain from reminding you of them in order not to spoil the atmosphere of the Conference -- these facts are known to the whole world. You are doing everything to get as much information as possible about the disposition of military targets in the territory of the Soviet Union. Therefore your insistent demands for an international system of control with all these components, which you have just put forward in the form of an ultimatum, lead us to very gloomy reflections. In any case, these demands are technically unsound, and politically they can be fully interpreted as a desire to establish an international system of espionage. Therefore your explanation of the statement of 3 September explains nothing. It cannot refute the actual fact that on 3 September your two Governments believed a national system of control to be adequate.

If you then considered it adequate and possible to do without an international system of control, if only in respect of atmospheric tests, why do you lay down as the basic condition for a treaty the mandatory acceptance of the principle of international control over all tests? Why? There is no justification for this attitude other than the desire to establish control for definite political and military purposes. It cannot be explained in any other way.

Those are my comments on the explanations given us by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I shall now deal with the suggestions and views which were expressed yesterday by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, and try to answer some of his puzzled questions.

Mr. Godber asked me some questions and requested three simple answers to the following three questions.

First: "Does the Soviet Union really offer us no hope of any form of international inspection of any unidentified events in the Soviet Union, in any circumstances, short of the achievement of complete and general disarmament?"

(ENDC/PV.14, page 35.)

I shall not beat about the bush. There is no hope.

Secondly: "Does the Soviet Union reject, on grounds of espionage, the presence of unaligned nations on a visiting inspection team? If so why do they so reject it?"

This question does not arise for us, because we reject a system of international inspection for these purposes. Therefore, the question of who will be in a visiting inspection team does not arise. It is now irrelevant.

But why does Mr. Godber ask such a question? Does it help him to solve the whole problem? Nothing of the kind. He is perfectly well aware of our position that we are altogether opposed to inspection when control can be ensured by national means of detection. But he puts the question deliberately in order to attempt to present the Soviet Union, in the eyes of public opinion of the whole world, including the neutral countries, as being opposed even to neutral representatives. But, Mr. Godber, this seems to me to be sufficiently clear to all the members of the Committee, and I have no intention of playing into your hand. I simply consider that the putting of such a question is absolutely unjustified by the substance of the matter. This question does not arise for us, because we altogether reject the principle of international inspection now for identifying such events. International inspection is unnecessary. We assert this on the basis of experience. We reject international inspection on the basis of our seismic data. And there is no sense in putting this question.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Thirdly: "Is the Soviet Union unwilling either to furnish us with any information about possible means of improving detection and identification systems or to allow their scientists to undertake joint discussions of the matter with our scientists?"

As regards an exchange of views, I think that this too is a question that does not arise. We have a vast number of scientific exchanges of all kinds with the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries. We participate in many international technical and scientific conferences and so forth.

We have not refused, do not refuse and will not refuse such exchanges. But if you now want to make the question of discontinuance depend on these exchanges, we say "No". We will not make a solution to the political question of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests depend upon that.

We consider it absolutely essential to discontinue all tests of nuclear weapons and we will not replace the political solution of the question by technical discussions now. Those are our replies to the three questions you asked.

I should now like, for the sake of fairness, to ask some questions. I am awaiting replies to the two questions which I put earlier, but to which, I regret to say, I have not received any reply. I asked the question: Why do the United States and the United Kingdom, knowing that the possibility of a violation of a treaty in respect of underground tests could first and foremost concern the United States, which carries out such tests, at the same time persistently demand international control which, according to their own statements, they need mainly because of the doubts of the United States and the United Kingdom about the detection and identification of precisely these underground tests?

I have not heard an answer to this question. And I do not think that the members of the Committee have heard one either. If I answer you, then you should answer me.

The second question which I put to the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom was: For what reason did they decide to resume the nuclear arms race with their tests? The representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States themselves have not given a clear answer to this question. They have not even given it today. Why do you consider it necessary to resume tests in the atmosphere now? Why? Why do you need them? You do not give an answer. Why can you not stop or postpone them? Why? Answer this question.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

It is not we who demand an answer to this question -- the whole world demands an answer. But you do not reply to it. We have answered this question for you, and I think that our answer has solid foundations in view of the general policy of the United States and the United Kingdom in this matter. But you yourselves do not answer. You avoid giving an answer to this question. I think it is quite clear to most of the members of the Committee that new nuclear weapons tests would be, as Mr. Dean said, the beginning of a new spiral in the nuclear arms race and that it would be fraught, perhaps, with irreparable consequences both for mankind and for the whole cause of disarmament.

It was precisely for this reason that apprehensions were expressed about the fate of our Conference and its future work on the most important problem, which is now raised by life itself -- the problem of general and complete disarmament. It is precisely because matters are now so crucial that a reply must be given to this question, and we must exert every effort to prevent this new dangerous spiral in the nuclear arms race.

We consider it possible to prevent this new spiral in nuclear arms, and we consider it possible and essential to sign immediately an agreement on the basis which is a direct logical consequence of the real situation and the possibility of detecting and identifying all nuclear explosions, that is, on the national basis. How to improve this national basis -- national systems of detection -- is a matter that must be studied. But it is precisely on this basis that such a treaty can be concluded immediately and all nuclear weapon tests discontinued.

We hope that during the future work of the Sub-Committee which has been specially set up to deal with this problem, a solution to it may be found on this reasonable basis.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Among the names on the list of speakers this morning on the nuclear test ban question I have the representatives of India and Ethiopia. It seems to me that it would be better if we were to follow the order of inscription. I will of course reply at a future time to the numerous distortions and mis-statements made in the Soviet representative's statement, because, as I think he well knows, the "Gnome" shot was not a decoupled shot.

Mr. LALL (India): The purpose of this brief intervention is simple. It is this. In our anxiety and concern that the testing of nuclear weapons should not continue we would formally request the three nuclear Powers, which we understand are going to meet again in their Sub-Committee, to be good enough to present another report next Monday to this Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. We make this request to them because we sincerely hope that another effort can be made by the Powers directly concerned in this matter, and then perhaps by this Committee itself, to reach agreement and to avert this new threat of another spiral of tests.

It is somewhat depressing, if I may say so, to be the third side in this question. There are not just two sides to this question, namely, the Western side and the other side: there is the third side, represented by the unaligned countries. And there is a wider side than the unaligned countries: there is the world itself. There is the opinion of the world itself, Mr. Chairman, and I think you will bear with me, and I trust the representative of the Soviet Union will bear with me, when I say that whoever tests, whoever embarks upon this series and whoever continues it will earn the bitter resentment of the world, will cause a feeling of deep disappointment in the world that this spiral of tests should be recommenced and continued.

I address this, naturally, to both sides because we understand both are preparing tests. It will be of no help to the future to say that the purpose of further testing was a search for security. No security can be found in this way -- and the leaders of both sides have said so. The leaders of both sides have said that there can be no security through the perfecting of weapons of mass destruction. Yet, urged by some incomprehensible forces, the two sides continue to develop weapons of mass destruction. This is such a basic contradiction that it tremendously increases the apprehension of the world. Obviously we are standing near a very dangerous precipice if the very countries which announce that they cannot find security in the development of weapons still go ahead and develop weapons of mass destruction further and further.

This is a depressing fact to us. But, even at this late hour, I confess that we look for hopeful elements in the situation.

Thus, we note, Mr. Chairman, that you have said today -- and we are glad you have said it -- that you welcome the efforts that have been made by the non-nuclear non-aligned countries here and that you would agree to examine their suggestions.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I would also like to draw attention to a remark which I heard from Mr. Zorin in his statement today -- of course, I heard this in the translation and I cannot vouch for its accuracy. Mr. Zorin seemed to be saying that there is some lack of clarity in the matter of underground shots, that the Governments of the world are uncertain whether it is possible to detect all such shots. That statement has a similar ring to the following part of Mr. Godber's statement yesterday:

"We do think that the majority of underground nuclear events can be detected, but we do not think that underground nuclear events can be identified." (ENDC/PV.14, page 29)

He said that immediately after admitting that the larger explosions in the atmosphere could be detected and identified.

Finally, I thought that today Mr. Zorin asked this question: In view of the 3 September 1961 offer of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, why do you ask for international controls for all tests?

Perhaps we are wrong and over-hopeful in picking out these elements in which the possibilities of further discussion, at any rate, between the countries concerned do not appear to be excluded. I hope we are not wrong in doing so. I hope that it will be possible for the three countries to consider this matter. I would urge them to remember that they are not the only two sides in this question of testing: there is the world itself. These three countries combined represent, if I may say so, hardly the population of my own country, and we have only one-sixth or one-seventh of the world's population. Therefore, the concern which we express here in this matter of testing is a concern which is felt by very large numbers of people -- far larger than the number who will be involved directly in the discussions of the nuclear Sub-Committee.

We would therefore beg the Sub-Committee to reconsider this matter, to find the means of coming to some agreement, and to be good enough to report to us again next Monday.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I can hardly add anything to what the representative of India has just stated. I wish only to add the voice of my delegation to the appeal which he has made, and perhaps refer to three points which seem to me to require special attention.

The first point is, I think, causing a great deal of concern not only to my delegation and to my country, but to all of us here. As I said the other day, in the public mind the idea is developing that the nuclear Powers do not really want an agreement. This may be wrong or it may be right. I sincerely hope that it is wrong. But I notice that even in the very responsible newspapers this tendency is creeping in. I submit that this is a very important factor to consider in our deliberations.

Secondly, I wish to express the satisfaction of my delegation that the representative of the United States has said that he would take into account and study the various suggestions which have been made. We hope very much that all the suggestions which have been made here will be considered and that early next week a report will be submitted to us. Of course, we very much hope -- and I use the word "hope" in the sense in which the representative of Brazil used it yesterday -- that the Sub-Committee will be able to report agreement.

Finally, I want to say that it might be very helpful if you would spend the remainder of this week, the week-end, and the early part of next week on this very important question. I think it is serious enough to -- I will not say subordinate the rest of our work to it -- but to require first priority and the devotion of all your energies to it. In our mind, if we succeed in this, then we have a very good chance of succeeding in most of the other difficult work. But if we fail in this, I think our work will be very difficult.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I appreciated your statement very much. I think I detected in both your statement and that of the representative of the Soviet Union a willingness to consider the suggestions that have been made. We would very much hope that this time when you submit a report to us you will show us concrete results, and indeed, a final agreement.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): It is my understanding that the representative of the Soviet Union wishes to exercise his right to reply, but I hope he will bear with me for just a moment while I say the following.

If the suggestions made by the representatives of India and Ethiopia are acceptable to the representative of the Soviet Union and to the representative of the United Kingdom, they are quite acceptable to the United States.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I want to say literally just a few words.

First, I welcome the fact that the representative of India and the representative of Ethiopia have expressed a wish that the three Powers should continue their work in the Sub-Committee and have voiced the hope that this work will result in some progress. We too have not yet lost hope of progress and, bearing in mind everything that has been said here, we shall continue our work in the Sub-Committee.

Secondly, Mr. Dean has made a remark which is apparently intended to be explanatory and which he will obviously amplify in a future statement. He said that the "Gnome" shot was not a decoupled shot, in other words that it was fired not in a large cavity but in a salt formation. This is how his remark may be interpreted. But I should like to say that opinions differ on that point and that United States sources speak of the shot being fired either in a salt formation or in a large cavity. But that does not alter the principle of the case, since, according to the claims made by United States scientists themselves regarding the possibility of muffling or completely decoupling underground nuclear explosions, an explosion has been set off in a solid salt formation, which, according to these claims, reduces the seismic effect of the explosion to one-third. If the shot was fired in a large cavity hollowed out in the salt formation, then according to the technical data which I quoted, the explosion would have been reduced by a factor of about 300. If this shot was fired directly in a solid salt formation and not in a cavity, the salt formation would still have reduced the seismic effect of the explosion to one-third. You contended that the contrary was the case. You contended that the "Gnome" shot increased the seismic effect, rather than reduced it. The factor by which the explosion was reduced is another matter. Whichever case we take -- whether the explosion took place in a solid salt formation or in a cavity -- according to the data given by United States scientists

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

themselves, the seismic signals produced by the explosion are reduced. You on the other hand have asserted that it intensified the seismic signals and that this explosion could therefore easily be recorded. This is the crux of the matter. I await, of course, Mr. Dean's detailed explanation, but I want to say here and now that it is not a matter of decoupling but of a diametrically-opposed interpretation of the effects of such an explosion.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): In my capacity as head of the United States delegation I will reply to Mr. Zorin at a later date in somewhat more detail. I am afraid there is some confusion on this score, but I will not take up the time of the Conference to go into that question now.

I call on the representative of the United Kingdom in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I do not wish to detain the Committee for more than a moment but I thought that, in view of the fact that the representative of the Soviet Union did answer my questions and posed two in reply, it would be only courteous for me to give him an immediate reaction. I should naturally like time to consider the implications of his questions more carefully and to develop my answers more fully at another time.

As I understand his first question, it related to the concern of the United States and the United Kingdom about the possibility of underground violations. He asked why we insisted on international control for underground shots. It was difficult for me to take down the exact words, but that is how I understood the question. Well, I should have thought that the reason why we felt this was necessary was abundantly clear, and if it were not clear from what we, the Western nations, have said, it must have been clear from the quotation I gave only yesterday from Mr. Khrushchev himself. May I just repeat one sentence of the reply which Mr. Khrushchev made on 9 September to the proposal of 3 September put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom? This was his argument against accepting a test ban treaty which did not include underground tests:

"In fact, governments would be continuing, so to speak, under legalized arrangements to improve their existing designs ... and for this purpose would be using underground tests ..." (GEN/DNT/121, page 3)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

He was pointing to the danger of exactly such a situation, and if Mr. Khrushchev felt that, I would have thought that Mr. Zorin probably felt it too. It seems to me that this is the reason.

As to his second question -- which was, why decide to resume the arms race? -- I find it incredible, frankly, that the representative of the Soviet Union should pose such a question. Everybody here knows who resumed the nuclear testing race; everybody knows that now that it has been resumed it is terribly difficult to stop. That was why we tried very hard last autumn to dissuade the Soviet Union and made certain propositions to it. But having set this in motion, it is not for the Soviet Union to criticize others who feel bound for their own security to continue it. We in the West have made it quite clear that we are very anxious not to carry out further tests, and if the Soviet Union would accept an agreement on the basis on which they appeared willing to consider one less than a year ago, those further tests would not even now take place. That is the position.

What does disturb me is that while my three questions were genuinely posed to try to find out if there existed some area of agreement or if there were some way in which the Soviet Union would come to meet us -- and in spite of what Mr. Zorin has said this morning in regard to them, those were the genuine feelings behind my questions -- the questions which he in turn has posed to me are polemical in nature and show no indication of willingness to co-operate. I regret that very much. I do not want to develop this further now. I would merely say on behalf of the United Kingdom that I shall be very glad to continue our discussions as suggested by the representatives of India and Ethiopia. I hope very much that we may find some way of making progress, although I must admit that the statement we heard from the representative of the Soviet Union this morning does not increase my confidence in that regard.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I do not want to detain the Committee at this stage. I listened with satisfaction to the answer which Mr. Godber has just given. He has attempted to give a purely formal answer and did not answer the questions of substance which I raised. He replied to my first question, relating to underground explosions, but the point of my question was as follows: Why do you insist on international control not only over underground explosions but also over all other explosions, although it is clear from your own statements that your doubts relate solely to underground explosions? To this he has not provided any answer.

The other question was about the nuclear arms race: Why are you resuming tests at this time? You tell us that since matters have been set in motion, they must continue. But who, pray, began them? It was you who were the first to start testing

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

generally. Mr. Khrushchev was right when he said that all our tests were carried out solely in reply to your tests. But why do you have to carry out tests in reply to our tests? There is no justification for that. You were the first to begin any testing; you have carried out twice as many tests as we have. It is impossible to understand why you have to go on doing so. So this answer too cannot satisfy us. But obviously Mr. Godber has said all that he could say.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Am I correct in my understanding that the representative of Poland has now withdrawn his name from the list of speakers?

Mr. LACHS (Poland): I only wanted to take the floor this morning, Mr. Chairman, to reply to your appeal for co-operation in solving this difficult problem; but I shall have an opportunity to do so at the beginning of next week and I shall avail myself of that opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Does any other representative wish to speak on our first item of business this morning -- the question of the nuclear test ban? If not, we will proceed to our second item of business. It was agreed that after our discussion on the nuclear test ban we should proceed to the subject of general and complete disarmament.

In my capacity as representative of the United States I would like to lay before the Conference some ideas which I hope will set us forward in our task of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament.

We have already discussed the preamble to such an agreement and other delegations, along with my own, have submitted proposals and suggestions to the Secretariat. I would like to inform the Conference that the two co-Chairmen have met -- and, I believe, constructively -- and we will continue to meet to consider these propositions with a view to reaching agreement on a draft of a preamble which the two co-Chairmen can recommend to the Conference.

In this connexion let me stress my agreement with the points made at our meeting on 30 March by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and India (ENDC/PV.12). We consider that at this stage we should have merely a preliminary consideration of the text and then, if necessary and desirable, we should return to the preamble at a later stage in the negotiations, when any delegation would be free to make whatever further suggestions it wished. Thus it seems to me we have got off to a good start in our work, although we must remember that, however important the

(The Chairman, United States)

preamble would be from the standpoint of setting the tone and dignity of the agreement that we reach, we have not yet touched upon any of the central issues we must resolve in order to make real progress.

Today my delegation will table for consideration by this Conference part I of the document entitled "United States draft outline of provisions of a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" (ENDC/18). This part of our outline treaty will be comparable to part I of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2), although, as will readily be seen, it is expressed in somewhat different form. The document we are tabling today comprises two sections, A and B, and is designed to follow immediately after the preamble. Its purpose is to set out the objectives of the treaty and the principles which would guide the achievement of these objectives. We submit to the Conference that this is a more workmanlike approach than that followed by the Soviet Union, which sets forth these objectives in the terms of obligations. The obligations in the first three articles of the Soviet treaty provisions are more appropriately descriptions of what the treaty, when fully drafted, would accomplish, but these articles, as is readily apparent, do not constitute obligations in and of themselves. That is why we would like to explain to the Conference that we have chosen to put our part I in terms of a statement of overall objectives and principles. Each one of these objectives and principles, as is true in the case of the Soviet obligations, would need to be given effect and force by subsequent carefully-drafted provisions of the treaty and its annexes.

Let me review these objectives for the Conference. I ask each member, in listening to these objectives, to think of them in terms of paragraphs successively describing what the full text of the treaty would have to accomplish. The first paragraph of section A would read as follows:

"1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

This paragraph is drawn from the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of the Soviet Union and the United States, and we would incorporate this provision of the Principles as part of the final treaty. We believe that it describes the first and foremost objectives which the treaty must accomplish.

(The Chairman, United States)

The next paragraph would read as follows:

"2. To provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

- (a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
- (b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;
- (c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;
- (d) Abolishment of the organization and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;
- (e) Discontinuance of military expenditures."

This paragraph sets out what the treaty must provide with respect to national disarmament. Of course one can, as is done in the Soviet article 1, make a much more extensive list of the components of general and complete disarmament. The list in our proposal merely repeats the essential components contained in the agreement on this definition in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. Let me make it quite clear that if there are any points that are implicitly omitted from this list we will be quite prepared to add them.

Let me again make this clear: By general and complete disarmament, the United States means exactly that -- general and complete disarmament. But we do not see any need to make up overlapping, redundant lists. The treaty itself would have to deal with all these components. I believe that the essential items in the Soviet list are covered by the list we have submitted, based upon the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles.

Let me turn to the third objective, which reads as follows:

"To ensure that, at the completion of the programme for general and complete disarmament, States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States will support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force".

(The Chairman, United States)

This is also drawn from the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. It is intended to make clear what objective the treaty must ensure with respect to the armaments remaining to States.

The final paragraph in the statement of objectives reads as follows:

"To establish and provide for the effective operation of an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations, for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under the disarmament programme are honoured and observed from beginning to end".

This paragraph, which is based on the substance of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, is intended to make it clear that the provisions of the treaty must provide for the establishment and operation of an international disarmament organization.

Section B of our proposals is entitled "Principles" and would represent the guidelines to be followed in proceeding to the objectives we set forth. The first of these principles would be as follows:

"Disarmament will be implemented until it is completed by stages of balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out within a specified time-limit".

This paragraph again is drawn from the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and describes in broad terms a basic principle which will have to be observed by the successive provisions of the treaty in achieving the objectives set out in section A.

Paragraph 2 of section B entitled "Principles" reads as follows:

"Disarmament will be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage, and that security is ensured equally for all".

This is essentially the same as paragraph 4 of article 1 of the Soviet draft. Paragraph 3 of our proposed principles would read as follows.

"Compliance with all disarmament obligations will be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements will be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the disarmament process that agreed reductions are accomplished and that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces are not exceeded".

(The Chairman, United States)

This principle, we believe, is implicit in paragraph 6 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and for the most part it is covered in article 2 of the Soviet basic treaty provisions. It will be noted, I submit, that this proposed principle is clearer in one respect than the comparable part of the Soviet basic treaty provisions. The United States proposal is that the verification arrangements will have to be adequate to ensure "that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces are not exceeded". The United States, for its part, could not accept an arrangement which would not allow us to tell whether an agreed limitation on force levels was being exceeded. The Soviet Union, we believe, has tended to dismiss this point with the claim that we are seeking "control over armaments". We believe, that as negotiations progress our discussions in this Committee will show to the Conference quite conclusively that in many instances it will not be sufficient simply to verify the arms reduced if we are to meet the agreed criterion of maintaining security for all. The United States believes that this point can be dealt with most successfully when we come to the discussion of the specific control provisions which will be required for specific disarmament measures.

The fourth paragraph of the proposed principles reads as follows:

"As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations will be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international co-operation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind".

We do not believe that this principle need give us any difficulty since, again, it is implicit in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles.

The final principle in our section B reads as follows:

"Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next should take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate".

This principle is taken verbatim from the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and is essentially the same as paragraph 3 of article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty.

(The Chairman, United States)

This general review of part I of the United States and Soviet proposals reveals that there is a significant amount of agreement between the positions. We believe that it will be useful if we can record agreement on the texts we have submitted as essentially a preliminary description of what the overall treaty will have to accomplish and the principles which will be observed in accomplishing those things.

We submit to the Conference our belief that it is much better to adopt such a section in the form we have suggested, rather than in the form the Soviet Union has proposed. Part I of the Soviet draft, although it is entitled "Obligations", cannot really serve as such, since implementation would depend upon the entire remainder of the text of the treaty and of all its annexes. After all, the obligations to be undertaken by States comprise the sum total of the agreements we will have reached. If the Soviet Union can agree to this approach, as I sincerely hope it can, I believe that we can quickly follow this agreement on the preamble with agreement on another significant section of the basic treaty provisions.

We could then move ahead directly to concern ourselves with those substantive areas of disarmament which must be incorporated in the agreement and with the drafting of the actual provisions which would put this disarmament into effect. I hope this can take place, but if it is not possible, we propose that we should by-pass this section temporarily and come back to it when it can be reconsidered in the light of the subsequent, more detailed substantive provisions of the agreement.

I would like now to turn to a more important and substantive aspect of our work. In my statement before this Conference on 29 March, I reviewed the broad provisions of the plans of the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to how each dealt with the area of disarmament specified in paragraph 3 (b) of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/PV.11, page 9). That paragraph states:

"To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishments of every nation, for:

"Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons." (ENDC/5, page 2)

(The Chairman, United States)

Today I want to deal in more detail with the way in which the respective plans of the United States and the Soviet Union deal with the major element of this agreed objective -- the elimination of nuclear weapons -- in the first stage. Stage I of the United States plan is designed to put a complete and immediate stop to the spread of a nuclear weapons capability to nations not now having such a capability. Furthermore, the United States plan, if implemented, would ensure a complete stop to a further increase in stockpiles of nuclear weapons and an early reduction of these stockpiles. As Secretary of State Rusk pointed out on 27 March, our problem is to take early action to prevent the future growth of weapons stockpiles which, if firm and quick action is not taken, could double in their destructive power by 1966.

The cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons is not a difficult measure to accomplish. A cut-off would include either the shut-down and/or the monitored operation of all nuclear reactors which produce plutonium 239 for use in weapons and of isotope separation plants which produce high-enrichment uranium 235 for use in weapons.

There are two other general methods of securing a cut-off of production, both of which might be explored -- perhaps, if the Conference agrees, in a sub-committee of the Conference. The first would be to continue production at the current rate, while ensuring through detailed inspection that all fissionable material was accounted for and not diverted to weapons use. This alternative might prove to be less desirable because of the more complex inspection operation which it would involve. The second alternative is to provide for a complete and absolute shut-down of all facilities used specifically for the production of fissionable materials. In this shut-down method, inspection would be greatly simplified, since it would be quite easy to see that the plant was not in fact in operation.

The United States believes that a truly major objective would be accomplished if, in stage I of the plan, this kind of firm lid were put on the production of nuclear weapons. However, important as is the production cut-off in and of itself, it would still not entail any actual nuclear disarmament. That is why the United States goes on, in paragraph C of stage I of its plan, to propose that:

"Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes." (ENDC/6, page )

(The Chairman, United States)

The purpose of this proposal, in turn, is to ensure that some degree of nuclear disarmament takes place in the first stage. At the second meeting of our Conference, Secretary of State Rusk proposed that this initial amount be specifically fifty metric tons of weapons grade U-235 (ENDC/PV.2, page 21). This proposal, as many of you know, represents an increase of 20,000 kilograms over the proposal presented to the United Nations by the then United States representative on 16 August 1960 (DC/PV.66, paragraph 64). At that time there was some misunderstanding of this proposal. It was alleged that "the proposals .... would limit the future manufacture of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons but they would not mean the destruction of existing stockpiles ...." (ibid., paragraph 222).

Mr. Lodge of the United States immediately clarified the position of the United States on these points, and I can do no better than quote him today. He said at that time:

"Since all future manufacture of fissionable materials would go to peaceful uses only, and not into weapons, it is obviously incorrect to characterize our proposal as an invitation to make more weapons. I repeat: under our proposal all plants producing enriched uranium and plutonium would either be completely shut down or their output earmarked exclusively for peaceful purposes." (DC/PV.68, paragraph 3)

He went on to say, with respect to our then proposal for the transfer of 30,000 kilograms:

"For our part, the only place from which this material could come is from present weapons stockpiles. Therefore, this transfer would directly and immediately result in the dismantling of sizeable numbers of weapons existing at present." (ibid., paragraph 4)

I can assure you again today that this proposal is a proposal for disarmament. However, if some other delegation, including the delegation of the Soviet Union, wishes to propose a figure other than the fifty metric tons of U-235 that we have suggested, we shall be very happy to have them do so. Let me assure the Committee that the United States will carefully consider any counter-proposal, whether it is for a larger or a smaller amount. What we seek to ensure, however, is that there will be an actual reduction in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament. We feel that this must be accomplished.

(The Chairman, United States)

The United States believes that in subsequent stages further reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles should take place on a balanced basis until their final elimination has been achieved.

The United States plan goes on to propose that: "Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency" (ENDC/6; page 5). The purpose of this proposal would be to ensure that international transfers of this material were not used for purposes other than those for which they were intended.

The United States plan then proposes an agreement that:

"States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation the information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other States, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture."

(ibid.)

Together with the other nuclear measures the United States has proposed in the first stage, this, we believe, would effectively ensure the freezing and the early reduction of nuclear arms. This is something which I am sure we all wish to bring about.

The final United States stage I proposal is that a Nuclear Experts Commission should meet to examine and report on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. As I stated on 29 March, this is a provision on which we had reached agreement in principle with the Soviet Union. The fact that this committee is no longer provided for in the first stage of the Soviet plan, as it was provided for in the Soviet plan of 23 September 1960, has not yet been explained by our Soviet colleagues. No doubt we shall hear from them on this point.

(The Chairman, United States)

If the Soviet Union agrees that now, in advance of the negotiation of the full agreement, we should establish such a Commission within the framework of this Conference, we are quite prepared to consider it.

The United States believes that this is an urgent matter. We are certain there will be many technical problems in devising a control system to ensure the verified elimination of nuclear weapons. We cannot begin this study too soon. Indeed, we cannot conclude a treaty providing for the unconditional elimination of nuclear weapons until this study has been completed.

I have limited myself this morning to commenting on the nuclear measures in the first stage of the United States programme. We hope that our further discussions in this area will serve to persuade the Soviet Union to accept in the first stage of the disarmament programme a very significant measure of nuclear disarmament.

Unfortunately, the Soviet treaty, as it presently stands, includes in the first stage only two measures relating to restrictions on nuclear weapons. These are in articles 16 and 17 of that treaty.

We believe that the quite limited Soviet proposals are good as far as they go. But we cannot convince ourselves that the first stage of the Soviet programme, even when implemented, would have any noticeable impact on the further production of nuclear weapons. We submit, therefore, that the Soviet draft in this respect is not very meaningful.

What we must try to do is to devise a single, overall agreement which draws upon the best from each proposal. The United States believes that the common plan should include a significantly greater measure of nuclear disarmament in its first stage than does the present Soviet plan. On the other hand, we submit that we must achieve a balanced programme that allows measured progress, by stages, to our final goal, general and complete disarmament. The United States would not ask for 100 per cent nuclear disarmament in the first stage, because this would upset the very fundamental principle of balance. That is why we believe our proposal represents the more correct approach. I wish to assure the Committee, however, that in this case, as indeed in the case of all subjects which we shall discuss, the United States comes to this Conference table with flexibility and with an open mind. We shall be prepared to consider any and all counter-proposals that meet the criteria which we have set for agreement on general and complete disarmament. We would indeed welcome any and all proposals which might be made in this respect by other delegations.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation does not propose at this meeting to offer any remarks with respect to article 1 of the draft treaty which the Soviet Union proposed and discussed at a previous meeting, nor with respect to the suggestions which the representative of the United States has put forward today concerning an alternative draft and the means of approaching it. However, we should like to take a little time to discuss our general method of work.

At the twelfth meeting of the Conference on 30 March, we had a lengthy discussion on the order in which we should carry on our work in this Committee in order to achieve agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament. There is a divergence of views on this point between the United States and the Soviet Union. Several delegations have spoken in support of the procedural approach of each of the co-Chairmen. The representative of Brazil remarked at that meeting:

"Consequently, if there is such an appreciable and wide disagreement, it relates to the method and not to the procedure. The Committee must first of all study this disagreement before attempting to resolve it." (ENDC/  
PV.12, page 21)

At the end of the meeting the representative of the Soviet Union gave, at some length, his views on the problem of how we should proceed or, to use the words of the representative of Brazil, what method we should use in carrying on our work. As I understand it, after studying Mr. Zorin's statement, his principal contention is that the Committee has two documents before it and that it should conduct its discussions based on the contents of those two documents, that is, the Soviet Union draft treaty and the United States programme. So far, there is no difference between the two points of view. But Mr. Zorin seemed to think that the proposal of Mr. Rusk, repeated by Mr. Dean, was that we should enter into a very generalized debate not related to the provisions contained in the two documents. Now that is not how I understand the United States proposals.

It appears that the representative of the Soviet Union and other representatives of Eastern European countries contend that we should consider all the elements which will enter into the eventual treaty on general and complete disarmament in the order in which they are set down in the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union. In his statement to the Conference on 27 March the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, said:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"Of course, in doing so, it would be reasonable to take up the document which most fully covers disarmament measures and control over disarmament, and clearly determines the sequence of their implementation, in short, gives the fullest and clearest picture of the whole process of general and complete disarmament from beginning to end. Such a document is already at the disposal of the Committee -- it is the draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control submitted by the Soviet Government on 15 March ...." (ENDC/PV.10, page 17)

Mr. Gromyko then went on to say:

"It should be understood that what I have said does not at all mean that insufficient attention will be given to the proposals of other delegations regarding general and complete disarmament. That is not the intention of the Soviet Government. On the contrary, we have in mind the simultaneous and thorough examination of all other proposals covering the questions under consideration in any particular stage of the negotiations when our draft treaty is discussed." (ibid.)

While these suggestions of Mr. Gromyko are doubtless intended to be equitable, I submit that they are not really so. The order in which the different provisions of the eventual programme or treaty are considered is a matter of importance -- of great importance. We have seen that there are differing views on what that order should be.

I think we must be careful to apply the principle of balance, not only in the eventual agreements we shall reach on how to disarm but in the negotiations which we are conducting here in this Committee in an attempt to reach that result. That is to say, in determining how and in what order we shall deal with the substantive questions of disarmament, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States should have a technical advantage through the character or priority in time of the document which it has submitted.

I think the Conference should remind itself of the object of our negotiations, as set out in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5). The first of these principles states: "The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme ....", and so forth. We are here to achieve agreement on a programme -- not to draft a treaty. Of course, when a programme is agreed upon we expect that a treaty will be drafted, but that is another stage of our work.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That there may be some misunderstanding on this point appear from the following statement of the representative of Bulgaria at our meeting on 30 March:

"If we now begin to discuss the points of agreement or disagreement before starting work on a treaty, how are we going to draft that treaty? We might have an interminable discussion without getting anywhere, and not succeed in drawing up a treaty on general and complete disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.12, page 36)

During the discussion on 30 March, at our twelfth meeting, I noted that several representatives used the analogy of building a house to describe what we are trying to do here. They observed that we had a blueprint for the agreement we hope to reach, which will serve as the basis for an eventual treaty. The trouble, if we consider ourselves as builders, is that we have not a single blueprint but two blueprints and their related specifications, and these come from two architects who, while they do agree on what the final structure is to be, propose to use different methods of construction and to schedule the building operations in a different manner. Therefore, before our house can be built we shall have to reconcile these two different blueprints and specifications and decide on the general method by which we are going to build.

In the view of the Canadian delegation the essence of what we have to do here is to try to arrive at some composition of the differences of approach, timing and phasing that are plainly seen when the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty are compared with those of the United States programme. Both these documents stipulate the same final goal, the goal set down in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. Presumably the drafters of the proposals in each of these documents, the Soviet draft treaty and the United States programme for general and complete disarmament, intended them to conform with the Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961. Now, if we take one or other of these documents and give it precedence as the framework of the agreement we are supposed to reach, we shall be in some sense prejudging the points which are really at issue, that is, as I have said, the relation in time to each other of the various acts of disarmament, the duration of time required for their accomplishment, and so forth.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Therefore, if one document is taken as the framework of our discussions, it puts those who are adhering to the formulation of the other document at a negotiating disadvantage. They would be put in the position of always having to offer amendments or objections, and thus would be shown, artificially, as being negative in their attitude. I am sure that no one here wishes to adopt a procedure which would have that result.

I think the representative of India had this difficulty in mind when he suggested that the co-Chairmen should discuss the method of work to be followed, and come to an agreement. He previously referred in general terms to the two approaches so far proposed, by the Soviet Union on the one hand and by the United States on the other. He also suggested that there might be other approaches. The important thing, he stressed, was that the co-Chairmen should come to some agreement on the method of work which would allow the Conference to "pursue without delay its primary objective of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.12, page 42)

With the idea that it might facilitate the task of the co-Chairmen in deciding on the order of business, a table has been drawn up showing, side by side, the related provisions of the Soviet draft treaty and the United States programme, article by article and paragraph by paragraph, so far as they can be so related. These are grouped under headings which show the main categories of measures of disarmament which have to be carried out, and also headings for related measures such as the creation of an international disarmament organization, the creation of a force under the United Nations to keep the peace, and so forth. This table has been circulated and is now before the Conference, and we would propose, if the Conference thinks it would be useful, to submit it as a Conference document.<sup>1/</sup>

Representatives will see from the draft before them that, although the same results are aimed at by the provisions of the two documents compared, their execution is foreseen in different ways, in different stages and at different times. As I have said before, these are the differences which have to be resolved in the deliberations of this Conference.

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1/ Circulated as documents ENDC/19 and Rev.1

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We would suggest respectfully that, in order to meet the desires of the Committee, the co-Chairmen -- perhaps with this tabular statement as an outline of the principal matters that have to be discussed -- should decide upon an order in which the several categories of measures should be debated. We have heard Mr. Rusk make certain suggestions as to the categories the United States delegation would prefer to begin to discuss, and presumably the order which the Soviet Union delegation would prefer is that in which the measures are set down in its draft treaty.

The Canadian delegation feels that it should be entirely possible for the co-Chairmen to agree quickly on the order of discussion, or at any rate the first few items of the discussion, so that thereafter the Committee could proceed systematically with its work.

In this connexion, may I recall that the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, in his statement on 19 March, observed that:

"The United States programme and the Soviet draft treaty both call for reductions of conventional arms in the first stage. The Soviet plan provides for reductions proportionate to manpower cuts. At our second meeting the representative of the United States put forward new proposals calling for a reduction by 30 per cent. My delegation believes that this development brings the views of the two major military Powers closer together. Detailed negotiations should begin at once to remove remaining differences." (ENDC/PV.4, page 29-30)

And Mr. Green went on to say:

"In the crucial field of nuclear disarmament the positions of the two sides have likewise been brought substantially closer by the significant new United States proposals for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage. The Soviet draft treaty calls for the complete elimination of all such vehicles in the opening stage. Nevertheless, having in mind the magnitude of the initial cuts proposed by the United States, as well as the agreed principle of balance, my delegation believes that detailed negotiation should bring the two major military Powers to agreement on phased reductions in this field."

(ENDC/PV.4, page 31)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation feels that it is in selecting important areas on which differences have to be ironed out and proceeding to debate them that this Conference can best accomplish its work. We suggest respectfully that what we propose will allow full consideration to be given to the proposals and the documents -- both of the Soviet Union and the United States -- that we have before us and will allow for the examination of any additional arguments or evidence supporting either viewpoint. We would hope that such a method of work would eventually lead to an accommodation of views, and agreement.

I think that the representative of the Soviet Union, in one of his statements, made the general observation that if it is not possible to reach agreement on one point the Committee might, for the time being, regard it as unsettled and pass on to another which might prove easier of solution. The Canadian delegation is fully in accordance with this method of work for the plenary meetings of the Committee -- indeed, it is in accord with the basis of the suggestions put forward by my Minister in his statement here, to the effect that the Committee should select from the proposals of both sides those which are susceptible of relatively easy agreement and work on them until a conclusion is reached. We are working on a problem -- a programme for general and complete disarmament -- which has many aspects. It is hardly to be expected that we shall reach full agreement on all these aspects before we make our report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, but we may hope to reach agreement on a considerable number of them. This would be something like dealing with a difficult scientific problem, involving many factors. To progress on some factors and isolate the more difficult ones can lead towards an eventual solution.

The Canadian delegation submits this suggestion for the consideration of the Committee and the co-Chairmen as a means for organizing our future work, in an endeavour to reach agreement on what measures should go into general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): The two co-Chairmen have recommended that the second meeting of the Committee of the Whole be held tomorrow at 10 a.m., and that the next plenary meeting be held on Friday at 10 a.m. If there is no objection, that might be noted in the communiqué.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I shall now read out a draft of the communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its fifteenth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. A.H. Dean, representative of the United States of America.

"The representatives of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India, Ethiopia and the United Kingdom made statements on the question of a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

"The Conference agreed that a further report from the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should be submitted next Monday, 9 April 1962.

"Statements were also made on the question of general disarmament by the representatives of the United States of America and Canada.

"The United States delegation tabled 'Part I: Objectives and Principles' of the United States outline of provisions of a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

"The Canadian delegation tabled 'An Outline Review: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America Disarmament Proposals'.

"The second meeting of the Committee of the Whole will be held on Thursday, 5 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 6 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have no comments to make on the text of the communique, but I think it is hardly possible or desirable for us to anticipate matters by stating that a report should be submitted by the Sub-Committee on Monday, because the debate has shown that there are serious differences of opinion. Although we are anxious to make progress, I do not think that this can be achieved in the course of the two or three Sub-Committee meetings that will be held during the intervening period. Therefore, I think it would be wiser not to pre-judge the question of when an interim report should be submitted. We shall, of course, take all these

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

views into account in our work, but to my mind it is premature and hardly realistic to state here and now that the report should be submitted on Monday. We should therefore simply omit this paragraph, it being understood that we shall of course in future do everything possible to submit something more positive than we have done so far.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): The Committee has heard the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union. Is this suggestion acceptable to the delegations of India and Ethiopia?

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): We would be agreeable to the word "Monday" being omitted and replaced, perhaps by "early next week".

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Is that acceptable? Since I hear no objections, the communiqué will be amended in accordance with the suggestion of the Soviet representative, which I understand is acceptable to the delegations of India and Ethiopia. That paragraph will then read:

"The Conference agreed that a further report from the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should be submitted early next week."

The communiqué, as amended, was adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.